



OLESEN VALUE FUND L.P.

& OLESEN VALUE FUND (CAYMAN) Ltd.

Global, unconstrained, long-term value investing

Investor Presentation

Nov 2025

This document does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy the limited partnership interests in Olesen Value Fund L.P. or the shares in Olesen Value Fund (Cayman) Ltd. described herein. No such offer or solicitation will be made prior to the delivery of an offering memorandum and other materials relating to the matters mentioned herein. Before making an investment decision with respect to Olesen Value Fund L.P. or Olesen Value Fund (Cayman) Ltd., potential investors are advised to read carefully the offering memorandum, limited partnership agreement, amended and restated memorandum and articles of association, and the related subscription documents, as applicable, and to consult with their tax advisors, financial advisors and legal counsel.

This document contains a preliminary summary of the purpose of Olesen Value Fund L.P. and Olesen Value Fund (Cayman) Ltd. and principal business terms of Olesen Value Fund L.P. and Olesen Value Fund (Cayman) Ltd. This summary does not purport to be complete and is qualified in its entirety by reference to the more detailed discussion contained in the offering memorandum and the actual text of the limited partnership agreement and the amended and restated memorandum and articles of association.

All investors and potential investors should be aware that an investment in a partnership or company of this nature is a speculative investment and may be subject to extreme volatility. The possibility for significant loss of principal exists. Investors should also be aware that investment in a limited partnership or company of this nature may have provisions limiting liquidity and the ability to exit the partnership or company. Investors should also be aware that the partnership and the company may charge significant management fees and performance fees. Investments in a limited partnership or company of this nature are for accredited and sophisticated investors only. No representation or warranty is made by Olesen Capital Management LLC, Olesen Value Fund GP LLC or any other person (including any of their agents or representatives) as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein. Only those particular representations and warranties which may be made in definitive agreements relating to the partnership or the company, when, as and if executed, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be specified in such definitive agreements, shall have any legal effect.

Past performance may not be indicative of future results.

The version of the MSCI All-Country World Index that is referred to in this document (MSCI AC World) is stated in local currency and includes reinvested net dividends. It can be located on the Bloomberg Professional Service terminal under the symbol MSEIAFLN.

Contents

I.	Executive Summary	1
II.	Neglected Micro & Small Cap Securities	6
III.	Contrarian Investments	7
IV.	Event-Driven Special Situations & Arbitrages	8
V.	Investment Process	9
VI.	Risk Philosophy & Management	10
VII.	Fund Manager Bio	11
VIII.	Historical Investment Returns, Net of Fees	12
IX.	Key Terms	13
X.	Third-Party Service Providers & Reporting	14
XI.	Detailed Historical Investment Performance Data	15
XII.	Manning & Napier—Neglected Micro Cap with Low Downside and Large Upside	21
XIII.	JPMorgan TARP Warrants—Excellent Bank at 0.98x Tangible Book Value and 7.7x P/E	22
XIV.	Vertu Motors plc—Investment Thesis Too Conjectural, Poor Investment Return	23
XV.	Whiting USA Trust II—Buy Oil at Discount via Liquidating Trust, Sell Oil Futures	24
XVI.	DeLclima S.p.A.—Value in Core European HVAC Mfg. Business Obscured by Non-Core	25
XVII.	Contact Information	26

Executive Summary

- Bottom-up, fundamental **value investing** philosophy. Inspired by Warren Buffett.
- Long-only portfolio (rare shorts). No leverage. Primarily equities. Primarily developed markets.
- The fund focuses on:
 1. Neglected Micro & Small Cap Securities
 2. Contrarian Investments (any market cap size, incl. large caps)
 3. Event-Driven Special Situations & Arbitrages (minor area of focus)
- What I look for: Good, proven business with long track record and strong balance sheet, trading below my estimate of intrinsic underlying business value, as a result of being (i) out of favor or (ii) neglected by Wall Street:
 1. Out of favor on Wall Street for non-rational (e.g., psychological) reasons (market overreaction, lack of investor patience or interest, etc.), but undervalued based on sound fundamental investment analysis.
 - 52-week low-high stock price range is typically very wide for any stock, even mature/stable businesses
 - Not plausible that intrinsic underlying business value could have fluctuated so

Executive Summary (cont'd)

much in a 52-week period, in most cases.

- Big, systemic opportunity for rational, long-term oriented investors.

or

2. Neglected by professional investors because of too low liquidity, technical (arbitrary) constraints, small size, or other special factors.

- Almost no large or sophisticated investors in this corner of the market → Little/no competition.
- Low liquidity and lack of Wall Street and institutional investor following → Imbalance between demand for and supply of shares can more easily lead to large overvaluation or undervaluation.
- There are many thousand publicly traded companies globally, some of which are good businesses well worth owning at the right price.
- Significant, systemic opportunity for nimble professional investors.

Executive Summary (cont'd)

- Highly focused portfolio:
 1. Typically 10-20 positions
 2. Much deeper, more thorough research and analysis on each investment
 3. Far more selective
 4. Can really focus our capital in the very best opportunities → Higher returns
 5. Intelligent diversification. Avoid di-worse-sification.
- I define risk as permanent loss of capital, not volatility. I seek to profit from volatility, not avoid it. Therefore, the fund is only suitable for very long-term oriented investors.
- Unconstrained mandate
 1. Highly flexible and opportunistic
 2. Invest in many different market cap sizes, industries, and countries (primarily North America, Western Europe and other developed markets)
- Not a top-down approach: Allocation among individual stocks, market cap sizes, industries, and countries varies considerably, based on where the best opportunities are. Bottom-up approach.

Executive Summary (cont'd)

- I have 100% of my own investable assets, aside from prudent rainy day reserves of cash and cash equivalents, invested in the fund.
- Investment Objectives:
 1. Compound my and my investors' wealth in absolute terms over the long run
 2. Avoid significant permanent loss of capital (but accept significant volatility)
 3. Significantly outperform global equities (after fees) over the long run
- Since inception, an investor in the fund would have earned 682% (12.9% annualized) net of fees (based on 0% management fee and 20% performance fee) vs. 567% (11.9% annualized) for the MSCI All Country World Index (incl. reinvested dividends), as of Oct 31, 2025.

\$100 invested at inception would have grown to \$782, net of fees.

See Section XI on pp. 15-20 for further details on the fund's historical investment returns.
- Highly tax-efficient for U.S. investors: Historically, almost 100% of the fund's income has been long-term capital gains or qualified dividend income, which are taxed at lower rates.

Executive Summary (cont'd)

- Key terms:

Management fee	0.00%
Performance fee	20% of profits
High watermark?	Yes. If an investor incurs a loss, the 20% performance fee does not start accruing until the loss has been recouped.
Redemptions	Monthly, upon 90 days advance notice
Lock-up	None
Gate	None
Minimum investment	None
Suitability requirement	U.S. investors must meet “accredited investor” requirement*

Neglected Micro & Small Cap Securities

- Low liquidity and therefore neglected by most professional investors → Few large or qualified competitors in this part of the market.
- Lack of sophisticated investors who follow a company sometimes leads to lack of investors who understand the business and its intrinsic value.
→ Sometimes the lack of understanding leads to large over- or undervaluation relative to the intrinsic underlying business value.
- Spotty investor following and very low professional investor involvement.
→ Sometimes temporary imbalances between demand for and supply of shares in a particular company leads to large over- or undervaluation relative to the intrinsic underlying business value.
- There are many thousand micro and small cap securities globally, some of which are good businesses well worth owning at the right price.
- Large systemic opportunity for nimble professional investors.

Contrarian Investments

- Any market cap size, incl. large caps.
- Capitalize on “excess volatility” (aka “Mr. Market”).
- Most companies’ intrinsic underlying business value does not fluctuate as much as their stock prices (cf. the wide 52-week range for most stocks).
 - Opportunity for rational, long-term-oriented investors to buy securities that are out of favor due to non-rational factors but undervalued based on sound fundamental investment analysis.
- Non-rational factors can cause (i) market overreaction to developments or (ii) lack of investor patience or interest (e.g., a boring investment without near-term catalysts).
- Non-rational factors include:
 - Behavioral/psychological reasons (e.g., fear, overconfidence, disinclination to go against popular investment themes, et al).
 - Institutional constraints (e.g., avoidance of securities that fall outside formal investment mandate, sensitivity to client perceptions of unpopular portfolio holdings, selling due to internal risk limits/policies, et al).

Event-Driven Special Situations & Arbitrages

- Typically temporary mispricings of securities arising in connection with a corporate event.
- Examples: Liquidations, contingent value rights, stubs, squeeze-outs, reverse squeeze-outs, orphaned securities, merger arbitrage in micro caps that are ignored by risk arb funds, trust units created by bankruptcy proceedings or litigation, auction-rate securities with failed auction, capital structure arbitrage, closed-end fund conversion to ETF or open-end fund, self-tender offers, etc.
- Sudden lack of natural buyers/holders following the corporate event → Potential for market mispricing.
- Focus on oddball or illiquid opportunities that are ignored by event-driven hedge funds → Much less competition, much higher likelihood of significant market mispricing.
- Investment outcome usually event-driven, not significantly correlated with market.
- Event-driven special situations & arbitrages is the fund's smallest area of focus.

Investment Process

1. Idea Generation

- Objective: Identify situations that warrant further investment of time. Weed out sub-par ideas in a time-efficient manner.
- Continuously maintain and improve my system for tracking investment ideas
- Capitalize on my prior research (former investments, competitors of portfolio companies, similar or related industries, etc.)
- Monitor markets for areas with non-rational behavior or variant perceptions
- Orient my antennae: Myriad information sources, industry connections, optimize time spent



2. Research & Analysis

- Objective: Get to bottom of all relevant issues, value business with reasonable confidence, fully assess risks
- Study company's history to understand present situation
- Historical quarterly earnings conference call transcripts
- Industry research
- Financial statement analysis, annual reports
- Speak with management
- Valuation analysis
- Other relevant information. Every situation is different.
- **This is the core, distinguishing, value-added part of my investment process**



3. Decision & Implementation

- Objective: Determine attractiveness of the investment and re-align the portfolio accordingly
- Estimate intrinsic value and assess risks, based on a synthesis of all relevant factors
- Discipline to walk away if the answer is too unclear
- Establish optimal size of investment according to risks and degree of undervaluation
- Consider any tax implications for our U.S. investors when selling other portfolio holdings → Maximize after-tax returns
- Execute trades
 - For illiquid securities: Balance trading costs against expediency and catalysts



4. Monitoring & Position Management

- Objective: Adjust position sizes according to changing circumstances in a timely manner
- Continuously monitor changes in price and fundamentals
- Opportunistically buy more if becomes more undervalued (up to max. size), reduce position size if becomes less undervalued
 - take advantage of unwarranted price fluctuations
- Continue to monitor after we sell → buy if it becomes undervalued again
- Monitor rejected investment ideas → re-evaluate potentially suitable investments if market price declines
- Monitoring enables me to better capitalize on my knowledge/research

Risk Philosophy & Management

Position-level risk management

- Stock price volatility is unavoidable/inevitable, but permanent loss of capital can be avoided
- Risk management is an integral, inseparable part of the investment process
- Avoid risky, unproven or unsustainable business models
- Avoid weak/vulnerable balance sheet
- Asset value can occasionally provide some downside protection
- Margin of safety: Low purchase price relative to est. underlying intrinsic value
- Arbitrage-type positions: Exposures usually fully hedged → only exposure is to the “event”

Portfolio-level risk management

- Adequate diversification, but avoid “di-worse-sification”
- Approx. 10-20 long positions. Very infrequent short positions (usually for arbitrage).
- Continuously monitor exposures to individual companies, industries, investment themes, countries, and other factors
- Disciplined reduction of position size as market price converges with est. intrinsic value → never hold oversized or overvalued positions. Optimize reward vs. risk in a timely manner.
- Currency exposure of non-U.S. positions is sometimes hedged
- No leverage
 - Exceptions: While the fund generally does not use leverage, it may be used in the discretion of the general partner, e.g. for arbitrage and other special situations, potentially with offsetting short positions. The fund may also invest in warrants or options and borrow securities for short sale.

Fund Manager Bio



Christian Olesen
Fund Manager

Christian Olesen is the founder and portfolio manager of the fund. Prior to starting the fund, he was an analyst/trader at hedge fund Xaraf Management in Greenwich, CT, which was a sub-advisor to Paloma Partners, a multi-strategy hedge fund with approx. \$2 billion under management at the time. At Xaraf, he performed fundamental research on companies as well as some trading responsibilities. Xaraf invested in various financial instruments across the capital structure, including equity and credit instruments. Previously, he was a Senior Research Associate at DebtTraders Group, a broker-dealer in New York, NY focusing on distressed and high yield bonds. He started his career as an analyst at financial advisory firm Stern Stewart & Co. in New York, NY, which is best known for the EVA™ (Economic Value Added) concept. Christian grew up in Denmark and moved to the U.S. in 1998 when he transferred to The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, where he earned a B.S. with concentrations in Finance and Accounting in 2000. He received the CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) designation in 2004.

Historical Investment Returns

	Olesen Value Fund, net of 0% management fee and 20% performance fee	MSCI All-Country World Index
2009* (13 mo's)	61.2%	30.8%
2010	21.9%	10.6%
2011	-6.0%	-6.5%
2012	30.0%	15.8%
2013	24.8%	25.5%
2014	10.5%	9.3%
2015	9.2%	1.2%
2016	12.0%	9.0%
2017	14.3%	19.8%
2018	-14.2%	-7.7%
2019	25.2%	26.2%
2020	15.5%	14.2%
2021	27.7%	20.9%
2022	-6.3%	-16.0%
2023	13.1%	21.6%
2024	4.1%	20.2%
2025 YTD	-3.5%	18.8%
Cumulative	682%	567%
Annualized	12.9%	11.9%

\$100 invested at inception would have grown to \$782, net of fees.

See Section XI on pp. 15-20 for further details on the fund's historical investment returns.

Key Terms

Management fee	0.00%
Performance fee	20% of profits
High watermark provision?	Yes. If an investor incurs a loss, the 20% performance fee does not start accruing until the loss has been recouped..
Withdrawals	Monthly, upon 90 days advance notice
Lock-up	None
Gate	None
Min. investment	None
Suitability requirement	U.S. investors must meet “accredited investor” requirement*

* Generally, either (i) min. \$200,000 in annual income (or \$300,000 together with spouse) or (ii) \$1 mil. in net worth (either individually or together with spouse). Contact us for further details.

Third-Party Service Providers & Reporting

Service providers

Auditor	BDO
Third-party fund administrator	Apex Fund Services
Tax compliance	Spicer Jeffries
Custodians	Interactive Brokers, MSSB, RBC, Axos
Bank	Northern Trust
Legal counsel	Sadis & Goldberg

Reporting

- Quarterly letters to investors
- Monthly statements et al via third-party administrator's portal, apexconnect.apexfs.com
- Annual Schedule K-1
- Annual audited financial statements
- Open door policy — I am always available to talk to investors

Historical Investment Performance Data (1 of 6)

Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World	Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World
		Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)				Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)	
Dec 2008	17.20%	13.64%	13.64%	13.76%	1.29%	May 2011	4.38%	3.22%	3.22%	3.54%	-1.33%
Jan 2009	6.44%	5.03%	5.03%	5.15%	-6.75%	Jun 2011	-1.16%	-1.06%	-1.06%	-0.94%	-1.62%
Feb 2009	-13.31%	-12.41%	-12.41%	-12.24%	-8.36%	Jul 2011	-3.69%	-3.11%	-3.11%	-3.00%	-2.49%
Mar 2009	5.18%	5.03%	5.03%	5.18%	6.78%	Aug 2011	-9.29%	-8.81%	-8.81%	-8.49%	-6.83%
Apr 2009	13.17%	11.12%	11.12%	11.15%	10.54%	Sep 2011	-7.01%	-7.16%	-7.16%	-7.01%	-6.22%
May 2009	10.00%	8.02%	8.02%	8.15%	6.44%	Oct 2011	7.99%	7.84%	7.84%	7.99%	8.59%
Jun 2009	1.13%	0.81%	0.81%	0.94%	-0.21%	Nov 2011	-5.57%	-5.72%	-5.72%	-5.57%	-1.61%
Jul 2009	10.31%	8.43%	8.43%	8.56%	7.68%	Dec 2011	4.48%	4.33%	4.33%	4.48%	0.51%
Aug 2009	4.35%	3.55%	3.55%	3.67%	3.28%	Jan 2012	2.92%	2.78%	2.78%	2.92%	4.71%
Sep 2009	4.75%	3.90%	3.90%	4.03%	3.45%	Feb 2012	6.64%	6.27%	6.27%	5.99%	4.69%
Oct 2009	-2.88%	-2.58%	-2.58%	-2.46%	-2.02%	Mar 2012	6.19%	4.85%	4.85%	4.98%	1.34%
Nov 2009	0.83%	0.58%	0.58%	0.71%	3.07%	Apr 2012	-1.44%	-1.29%	-1.29%	-1.17%	-1.41%
Dec 2009	5.45%	4.51%	4.51%	4.64%	3.74%	May 2012	-5.18%	-4.33%	-4.33%	-4.21%	-6.75%
Jan 2010	-0.63%	-0.77%	-0.77%	-0.63%	-3.71%	Jun 2012	1.02%	0.73%	0.73%	0.82%	4.00%
Feb 2010	4.94%	4.00%	4.00%	4.08%	1.69%	Jul 2012	5.14%	4.00%	4.00%	4.14%	1.40%
Mar 2010	4.63%	3.61%	3.61%	3.73%	6.49%	Aug 2012	5.34%	4.20%	4.20%	4.34%	1.73%
Apr 2010	0.48%	0.27%	0.27%	0.39%	0.23%	Sep 2012	4.09%	3.22%	3.22%	3.36%	2.42%
May 2010	-8.72%	-7.33%	-7.33%	-7.10%	-7.27%	Oct 2012	-0.71%	-0.70%	-0.70%	-0.59%	-0.44%
Jun 2010	-1.84%	-1.99%	-1.99%	-1.82%	-3.69%	Nov 2012	3.10%	2.43%	2.43%	2.56%	1.49%
Jul 2010	9.45%	7.98%	7.98%	7.92%	5.79%	Dec 2012	4.62%	3.69%	3.69%	3.83%	2.17%
Aug 2010	-2.85%	-2.42%	-2.42%	-2.31%	-3.09%	Jan 2013	8.12%	6.38%	6.38%	6.49%	4.86%
Sep 2010	9.18%	7.27%	7.27%	7.41%	7.06%	Feb 2013	2.63%	2.02%	2.02%	2.14%	1.16%
Oct 2010	2.91%	2.26%	2.26%	2.39%	2.78%	Mar 2013	1.08%	0.76%	0.76%	0.88%	2.22%
Nov 2010	0.45%	0.25%	0.25%	0.37%	-0.43%	Apr 2013	-0.81%	-0.78%	-0.78%	-0.66%	2.44%
Dec 2010	8.05%	6.50%	6.50%	6.64%	5.49%	May 2013	4.44%	3.50%	3.50%	3.62%	1.37%
Jan 2011	2.42%	1.82%	1.82%	1.94%	1.37%	Jun 2013	0.54%	0.33%	0.33%	0.44%	-2.74%
Feb 2011	3.16%	2.42%	2.42%	2.54%	2.31%	Jul 2013	4.90%	3.91%	3.91%	4.03%	4.36%
Mar 2011	-0.43%	-0.46%	-0.46%	-0.35%	-0.55%	Aug 2013	-3.41%	-2.94%	-2.94%	-2.83%	-1.85%
Apr 2011	0.06%	0.13%	0.13%	0.05%	2.07%	Sep 2013	1.93%	1.47%	1.47%	1.59%	3.78%

Historical Investment Performance Data (2 of 6)

Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World	Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World
		Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)				Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)	
Oct 2013	1.90%	1.45%	1.45%	1.57%	3.96%	Mar 2016	3.85%	3.70%	3.70%	3.85%	5.56%
Nov 2013	3.14%	2.48%	2.48%	2.61%	1.93%	Apr 2016	2.16%	2.02%	2.02%	2.16%	0.77%
Dec 2013	3.32%	2.65%	2.65%	2.78%	1.75%	May 2016	0.70%	0.55%	0.55%	0.70%	1.50%
Jan 2014	0.77%	0.50%	0.50%	0.61%	-3.35%	Jun 2016	-4.38%	-4.53%	-4.53%	-4.38%	-1.02%
Feb 2014	1.42%	1.02%	1.02%	1.14%	4.00%	Jul 2016	5.05%	4.91%	4.91%	5.05%	4.13%
Mar 2014	-0.03%	-0.14%	-0.14%	-0.02%	0.37%	Aug 2016	5.29%	4.49%	4.49%	4.40%	0.66%
Apr 2014	-0.79%	-0.75%	-0.75%	-0.63%	0.65%	Sep 2016	-2.63%	-2.24%	-2.24%	-2.13%	0.23%
May 2014	0.48%	0.27%	0.27%	0.39%	2.33%	Oct 2016	1.09%	0.75%	0.75%	0.87%	-0.53%
Jun 2014	0.45%	0.25%	0.25%	0.36%	1.49%	Nov 2016	7.61%	5.99%	5.99%	6.12%	2.09%
Jul 2014	-1.24%	-1.11%	-1.11%	-1.00%	-0.37%	Dec 2016	4.02%	3.15%	3.15%	3.28%	2.49%
Aug 2014	3.24%	2.47%	2.47%	2.60%	2.56%	Jan 2017	-0.12%	-0.27%	-0.27%	-0.12%	1.58%
Sep 2014	0.59%	0.36%	0.36%	0.48%	-1.35%	Feb 2017	4.68%	3.68%	3.68%	3.77%	2.93%
Oct 2014	0.68%	0.43%	0.43%	0.55%	1.15%	Mar 2017	-0.18%	-0.26%	-0.26%	-0.14%	1.07%
Nov 2014	3.20%	2.46%	2.46%	2.59%	2.68%	Apr 2017	0.60%	0.37%	0.37%	0.48%	1.28%
Dec 2014	3.72%	2.90%	2.90%	3.03%	-0.96%	May 2017	0.45%	0.25%	0.25%	0.37%	1.60%
Jan 2015	-6.74%	-6.89%	-6.89%	-6.74%	-0.35%	Jun 2017	3.88%	3.01%	3.01%	3.13%	0.20%
Feb 2015	6.79%	6.64%	6.64%	6.79%	5.62%	Jul 2017	-0.96%	-0.89%	-0.89%	-0.78%	1.82%
Mar 2015	-0.04%	-0.18%	-0.18%	-0.04%	-0.37%	Aug 2017	-0.04%	-0.15%	-0.15%	-0.03%	0.39%
Apr 2015	1.10%	0.94%	0.94%	0.97%	1.53%	Sep 2017	2.05%	1.55%	1.55%	1.67%	2.10%
May 2015	1.28%	0.91%	0.91%	1.03%	0.85%	Oct 2017	1.83%	1.37%	1.37%	1.49%	2.69%
Jun 2015	0.13%	-0.01%	-0.01%	0.11%	-2.86%	Nov 2017	3.29%	2.57%	2.57%	2.69%	1.29%
Jul 2015	3.97%	3.07%	3.07%	3.19%	1.76%	Dec 2017	1.29%	0.94%	0.94%	1.06%	1.28%
Aug 2015	1.30%	0.93%	0.93%	1.05%	-6.64%	Jan 2018	2.08%	1.66%	1.66%	1.66%	4.12%
Sep 2015	-0.34%	-0.39%	-0.39%	-0.28%	-3.37%	Feb 2018	-0.72%	-0.70%	-0.70%	-0.58%	-3.56%
Oct 2015	4.08%	3.18%	3.18%	3.31%	7.62%	Mar 2018	-2.20%	-2.11%	-2.11%	-1.94%	-2.25%
Nov 2015	-0.80%	-0.77%	-0.77%	-0.65%	0.31%	Apr 2018	0.14%	-0.00%	-0.00%	0.14%	1.83%
Dec 2015	0.81%	0.55%	0.55%	0.66%	-2.05%	May 2018	-1.28%	-1.43%	-1.43%	-1.28%	0.83%
Jan 2016	-6.27%	-6.41%	-6.41%	-6.27%	-5.40%	Jun 2018	1.20%	1.14%	1.20%	1.20%	-0.01%
Feb 2016	-1.39%	-1.54%	-1.54%	-1.39%	-1.37%	Jul 2018	0.27%	0.21%	0.27%	0.27%	2.98%

Historical Investment Performance Data (3 of 6)

Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World	Period	Gross Return	Net Return			MSCI AC World
		Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)				Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)	
Aug 2018	0.34%	0.28%	0.34%	0.34%	1.11%	Jan 2021	-0.04%	-0.10%	-0.04%	-0.04%	-0.16%
Sep 2018	-1.96%	-2.02%	-1.96%	-1.96%	0.52%	Feb 2021	13.43%	10.71%	10.08%	10.75%	2.42%
Oct 2018	-4.34%	-4.40%	-4.34%	-4.34%	-6.90%	Mar 2021	1.05%	0.81%	0.81%	0.86%	3.51%
Nov 2018	-3.37%	-3.43%	-3.37%	-3.37%	1.35%	Apr 2021	7.39%	6.02%	5.73%	6.07%	3.73%
Dec 2018	-5.07%	-5.14%	-5.07%	-5.07%	-7.25%	May 2021	6.26%	5.15%	4.92%	5.20%	1.08%
Jan 2019	8.46%	8.40%	8.46%	8.46%	7.23%	Jun 2021	-2.12%	-1.83%	-1.69%	-1.78%	2.15%
Feb 2019	-0.21%	-0.27%	-0.21%	-0.21%	3.06%	Jul 2021	0.34%	0.23%	0.27%	0.29%	0.71%
Mar 2019	-1.88%	-1.94%	-1.88%	-1.88%	1.58%	Aug 2021	3.26%	2.67%	2.58%	2.73%	2.62%
Apr 2019	3.76%	3.70%	3.76%	3.76%	3.61%	Sep 2021	-1.93%	-1.67%	-1.54%	-1.62%	-3.58%
May 2019	-2.14%	-2.21%	-2.14%	-2.14%	-5.77%	Oct 2021	3.97%	3.27%	3.16%	3.33%	4.95%
Jun 2019	4.23%	4.17%	4.23%	4.23%	5.73%	Nov 2021	-2.63%	-2.27%	-2.11%	-2.22%	-1.67%
Jul 2019	0.29%	0.23%	0.29%	0.29%	0.93%	Dec 2021	2.32%	1.90%	1.85%	1.95%	3.71%
Aug 2019	-3.00%	-3.06%	-3.00%	-3.00%	-2.01%	Jan 2022	0.66%	0.48%	0.50%	0.53%	-4.58%
Sep 2019	4.44%	4.38%	4.44%	4.44%	2.23%	Feb 2022	-2.76%	-2.70%	-2.60%	-2.63%	-2.62%
Oct 2019	1.61%	1.55%	1.61%	1.61%	2.00%	Mar 2022	-2.85%	-2.92%	-2.85%	-2.85%	2.51%
Nov 2019	3.86%	3.39%	2.99%	3.17%	2.85%	Apr 2022	-3.32%	-3.38%	-3.32%	-3.32%	-6.52%
Dec 2019	5.67%	4.50%	4.29%	4.56%	2.69%	May 2022	1.21%	1.15%	1.21%	1.21%	-0.24%
Jan 2020	0.27%	0.17%	0.20%	0.22%	-0.62%	Jun 2022	-5.63%	-5.69%	-5.63%	-5.63%	-7.40%
Feb 2020	-8.57%	-8.59%	-8.51%	-8.52%	-7.59%	Jul 2022	6.65%	6.59%	6.65%	6.65%	7.05%
Mar 2020	-19.87%	-19.93%	-19.87%	-19.87%	-12.86%	Aug 2022	-2.04%	-2.10%	-2.04%	-2.04%	-2.94%
Apr 2020	20.65%	20.58%	20.65%	20.65%	10.30%	Sep 2022	-4.77%	-4.83%	-4.77%	-4.77%	-8.43%
May 2020	-0.07%	-0.13%	-0.07%	-0.07%	4.24%	Oct 2022	5.28%	5.22%	5.28%	5.28%	6.04%
Jun 2020	-0.12%	-0.19%	-0.12%	-0.12%	2.86%	Nov 2022	6.08%	6.01%	6.08%	6.08%	6.26%
Jul 2020	0.86%	0.80%	0.86%	0.86%	3.95%	Dec 2022	-3.99%	-4.05%	-3.99%	-3.99%	-4.74%
Aug 2020	6.62%	6.55%	6.62%	6.62%	5.76%	Jan 2023	7.12%	7.05%	7.02%	7.04%	6.50%
Sep 2020	-3.24%	-3.30%	-3.24%	-3.24%	-2.73%	Feb 2023	-0.45%	-0.51%	-0.36%	-0.38%	-1.92%
Oct 2020	1.32%	1.26%	1.32%	1.32%	-2.48%	Mar 2023	-6.64%	-6.71%	-6.64%	-6.64%	2.44%
Nov 2020	11.69%	10.88%	10.57%	10.80%	11.41%	Apr 2023	-0.83%	-0.89%	-0.83%	-0.83%	1.35%
Dec 2020	14.62%	11.72%	11.07%	11.79%	3.84%	May 2023	-3.05%	-3.11%	-3.05%	-3.05%	-0.30%

Historical Investment Performance Data (4 of 6)

Period	Net Return				MSCI AC World	Period	Net Return				MSCI AC World
	Gross Return	Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)			Gross Return	Actual (with Fee Option 1)	Actual (with Fee Option 2)	Pro Forma (with 0%/20%)	
Jun 2023	2.08%	2.02%	2.08%	2.08%	5.44%	2009* (13 mo's)	78.32%	58.73%	58.73%	61.22%	30.81%
Jul 2023	4.32%	4.25%	4.32%	4.32%	3.17%	2010	27.38%	20.17%	20.17%	21.90%	10.60%
Aug 2023	-5.08%	-5.14%	-5.08%	-5.08%	-2.06%	2011	-6.01%	-7.63%	-7.63%	-6.01%	-6.50%
Sep 2023	-1.92%	-1.98%	-1.92%	-1.92%	-3.49%	2012	35.86%	28.50%	28.50%	29.97%	15.85%
Oct 2023	-2.10%	-2.16%	-2.10%	-2.10%	-2.73%	2013	31.00%	23.06%	23.06%	24.80%	25.52%
Nov 2023	10.76%	10.70%	10.76%	10.76%	8.07%	2014	13.08%	8.92%	8.92%	10.47%	9.35%
Dec 2023	11.48%	10.18%	9.54%	9.93%	4.05%	2015	11.53%	7.70%	7.70%	9.22%	1.24%
Jan 2024	0.18%	0.09%	0.13%	0.14%	1.24%	2016	15.06%	10.47%	10.47%	12.04%	9.04%
Feb 2024	-0.78%	-0.82%	-0.74%	-0.75%	4.65%	2017	17.93%	12.75%	12.75%	14.34%	19.80%
Mar 2024	2.40%	2.02%	1.95%	2.04%	3.36%	2018	-14.18%	-15.07%	-14.69%	-14.18%	-7.71%
Apr 2024	-1.32%	-1.11%	-0.99%	-1.06%	-2.78%	2019	27.35%	24.62%	24.65%	25.19%	26.22%
May 2024	1.90%	1.47%	1.43%	1.52%	3.69%	2020	19.39%	14.81%	14.55%	15.52%	14.18%
Jun 2024	-3.10%	-2.78%	-2.54%	-2.65%	2.51%	2021	34.69%	26.96%	26.02%	27.75%	20.90%
Jul 2024	11.20%	9.15%	8.61%	9.13%	1.18%	2022	-6.32%	-7.02%	-6.32%	-6.32%	-15.99%
Aug 2024	1.27%	0.99%	0.98%	1.04%	1.72%	2023	14.71%	12.60%	12.72%	13.12%	21.60%
Sep 2024	0.13%	0.06%	0.10%	0.11%	1.91%	2024	5.16%	4.13%	4.13%	4.13%	20.20%
Oct 2024	-4.28%	-3.55%	-3.30%	-3.50%	-1.12%	2025 YTD	-3.54%	-3.54%	-3.54%	-3.54%	18.78%
Nov 2024	0.87%	1.21%	1.04%	0.70%	4.09%	<u>Returns since inception:</u>					
Dec 2024	-2.61%	-2.12%	-2.12%	-2.12%	-1.61%	Cumulative	1145.74%	560.34%	562.66%	681.57%	567.08%
Jan 2025	2.41%	1.93%	1.93%	1.93%	3.27%	Annualized	16.08%	11.80%	11.83%	12.92%	11.87%
Feb 2025	-4.41%	-3.96%	-3.96%	-3.96%	-0.79%						
Mar 2025	-3.32%	-3.32%	-3.32%	-3.32%	-4.48%						
Apr 2025	6.57%	6.39%	6.39%	6.39%	-0.37%						
May 2025	3.45%	2.76%	2.76%	2.76%	5.64%						
Jun 2025	2.70%	2.18%	2.18%	2.18%	3.89%						
Jul 2025	-9.25%	-8.02%	-8.02%	-8.02%	2.18%						
Aug 2025	1.21%	1.21%	1.21%	1.21%	2.00%						
Sep 2025	-1.32%	-1.32%	-1.32%	-1.32%	3.62%						
Oct 2025	-0.67%	-0.67%	-0.67%	-0.67%	2.79%						

Historical Investment Performance Data (5 of 6)

Notes

Gross Return: This is the investment return before subtraction of the applicable incentive allocation (also referred to as “performance fee”) and any applicable management fee.

Net Return: The investment returns in these three columns are stated after subtraction of the applicable incentive allocation and any applicable management fee.

The three columns with net returns are calculated based on a hypothetical investor who invested at the inception of the fund and made no subsequent contributions or withdrawals, after the subtraction of the applicable incentive allocation and any applicable management fee (and taking into account the high watermark provision). The returns earned by a particular investor may differ from this, depending on the timing of the particular investor's contribution(s) and any withdrawal(s).

‘Net Return – Actual (with Fee Option 1)’ and ‘Net Return – Actual (with Fee Option 2)’: The returns in these two columns are based on the fees that were in place at the time the returns were earned. From inception through May 31, 2018, the incentive allocation was 20% and the management fee was 1.75%, and therefore the return in both of these two columns reflect 20% incentive allocation and 1.75% management fee during this period. From June 1, 2018 through Oct 31, 2024 investors could choose either Fee Option 1 (20% incentive allocation and 0.75% management fee) or Fee Option 2 (25% incentive allocation and 0% management fee). Since Nov 1, 2024, all investors have been charged 20% incentive allocation and 0% management fee, and the returns in both of these two columns therefore reflect 20% incentive allocation and 0% management fee subsequent to Nov 1, 2024.

In November, 2024, the returns for investors with Fee Option 1 as well as investors with Fee Option 2 were adjusted to give the new fees (20% incentive allocation and 0% management fee) retroactive effect to Jan 1, 2024, and this adjustment is reflected in the return for Nov 2024 in the columns Net Return – Actual (with Fee Option 1) and Net Return – Actual (with Fee Option 2).

The returns that have been reported historically in the monthly factsheets, monthly and quarterly investor updates and other investor materials have been based on Fee Option 2.

Historical Investment Performance Data (6 of 6)

Notes (continued)

Net Return – Pro Forma (with 0%/20%): This is the return that would have been earned by an investor who was simply charged 20% incentive allocation and 0% management fee since the inception of the fund.

* This is the 13-month period from inception on Dec 4, 2008 through Dec 31, 2009.

MSCI AC World: This is the version of the MSCI All Country World Index that can be located on the Bloomberg Professional Service using the symbol MSEIAFLN. It is one of the broadest indices of publicly traded equities available, including both developed and emerging markets. As of spring 2025, U.S. stocks comprise approx. 65% of the market capitalization of all the index components. The returns are measured in local currency terms and include reinvested dividends. Returns have not been reduced to reflect the costs an investor would likely have incurred in order to replicate the returns of the index.

The investment returns in this document are those of Olesen Value Fund L.P. (the “fund”). The returns of the fund’s “feeder fund”, Olesen Value Fund (Cayman) Ltd., which was established in June 2022 and whose sole purpose is to invest in Olesen Value Fund L.P., have been virtually identical to those of Olesen Value Fund L.P., as the feeder fund’s own expenses are paid for by the investment manager. The returns of the feeder fund and its audited financial statements are available upon request.

The fund’s financial statements have been audited every year since the fund’s inception. The results are audited within 120 days after the end of every calendar year. All audit opinions have been unqualified (i.e., no concerns were raised by the auditors). All audited financial statements are available upon request.

Case Study: Manning & Napier — Neglected Micro Cap with Low Downside and Large Upside

- Manning & Napier was an asset and wealth management firm with \$22 bn in assets under management from institutional and high net worth investors, founded in 1970.
- Bought the stock mid-March 2020 at **42% discount to est. liquidation value** when the stock price dipped sharply due to the stock market sell-off early in the pandemic. Most of the assets were **excess cash** not needed to support the firm's operations.
- The firm had always been profitable, had a very variable expense structure, and zero debt.
- Low price relative to liquidation value; profitable business → **Low downside**
- Costs were bloated. New CEO. I estimated earnings would increase substantially. We paid only **~2x my estimate of annual earnings in 2-3 years** → **Large upside**
- I **quickly** bought **additional** shares in Apr 2020 immediately after the firm announced it bought back a co-founder's 77% stake at an **extremely** financially accretive price, using a significant portion of its huge excess cash balance, as the market did not immediately fully appreciate the **enormous** positive implications for the per-share intrinsic value.
- Sold the investment a little over one year later at 273% gain.

Case Study: JPMorgan TARP Warrants — Levered to Excellent Bank Trading at 0.98x Tangible Book Value and 7.7x P/E

- **Generally** well run, growing bank with relatively good performance during 2008-2009 financial crisis, earning 14.6% return on tangible common equity as of early 2012.
- The stock was **out of favor** in Q2 2012 due to risk management fiasco in connection with trading losses, widely referred to as the ‘**London Whale**’ incident in the media.
- No indications this mistake was a sign of broader mismanagement, given the firm’s excellent longer-term **overall** performance and risk management track record.
- Ultimate loss (incl. regulatory fines): 4% of tangible common equity value at the time.
- Investor **sentiment** towards large financial institutions was negative/skeptical for years after the 2008-2009 financial crisis → The stock quickly fell out of favor.
- Increased and decreased our position size **several times** during 2012-2017, as the market price fluctuated (due to high sensitivity to changes in investor sentiment) relative to my **much more stable estimate of intrinsic business value**.
- We earned an IRR of 33% on this investment.

Case Study: Vertu Motors plc — Investment Thesis Too Conjectural, Poor Investment Return

- Bought shares in this franchised auto dealership group with approx. 100 locations across the UK, representing approx. 20 different car brands, in 2014-2015, at approx. 9x adj. EPS.
- Main thesis: **Profit margins** would gradually **increase** significantly as **underperforming dealerships** acquired in business combinations were **turned around**.
However, the margin increase simply failed to materialize and the stock price languished as the industry was out of favor after Brexit.
- Re-allocated the capital invested in Vertu to another UK auto dealership group, Cambria Automobiles plc, in 2019.
 - Trading multiples in this industry were low, and Cambria Automobiles appeared to be a very different and more attractive investment.
 - We lost 27% (-8.5% annualized) on our investment in Vertu
 - We earned 33% (11.8% annualized) over the next 2 ½ years on Cambria investment
- Main lesson learned:
 - Vertu did not have a solid enough **track record** of turning around acquired underperforming dealerships → The investment thesis was **too much conjecture**.

Case Study: Whiting USA Trust II — Buy Oil at a Discount via Liquidating Trust Units, Sell Matched Oil Futures

- Micro cap royalty trust, passively paying 100% of net cash profits from 1,300 mature producing onshore oil wells as dividends to trust unitholders every quarter, no retention of free cash flow, scheduled termination of the trust in early 2022.
- The **net** cash profits of the trust increased **drastically** when oil prices rose in 2021.
- Bought trust units in 2021 because the market price of the trust units did not yet reflect the increase in oil prices, and simultaneously sold oil futures with expiration dates matching the trust's expected oil production through its termination date.
- Took advantage of the large mispricing that quickly arose when investors missed the large impact the increase in oil prices would soon have on the **net** cash profits of the trust, because **this micro cap security was underfollowed** and poorly understood by investors.
- Realized 62% **near-arbitrage profit**, net of losses on the oil futures, over approx. one-year weighted average holding period by the time of the trust's final liquidation.

Case Study: DeLclima S.p.A. — Excellent European HVAC Manufacturing Business, Value of Core Business Obscured, Neglected Micro Cap

- DeLclima was a €200 mil. market cap Italian manufacturer of mid/high-end HVAC systems used in commercial buildings and data centers throughout Europe. Spin-off by De'Longhi.
- Earned an excellent, fairly consistent return on capital. Easily profitable in 2008-2009. Almost zero net debt.
- Non-cash write-downs and poor performance in **small, non-core** radiator business was **obscuring the value of the core HVAC business**
- Temporary inability to pay dividend due to legal **technicalities** → Not popular
- We paid **€1.40**/share in 2014 (9.5x adj. trailing EPS)
- Main **catalyst**: I thought the **non-core business** would likely be **sold or curtailed**, causing the market to better appreciate the value of the core business
 - This turned out to be correct → Rose to around **€2.40**/share in approx. one year (and we started selling shares)
 - Then we also got lucky in late 2015: Acquired by Mitsubishi Electric for **€4.44**/share

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